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The Treasury’s long-term fiscal projections are designed to 
inform present-day policy. They draw attention to existing 
trends and potential future global and national developments 
in society, demography, politics, technology and the 
economy, and the fiscal implications of continuing existing 
policy unchanged through those changes over the next 40 
years and beyond. They highlight that the later action is 
taken to offset an anticipated 
impact, the greater the policy 
change may have to be and 
also potentially the cost, not 
just in money but also in 
social cohesion if unusual 
intergenerational tensions 
develop as a consequence. 
But if large adjustments have 
to be made, even if over time, 
how might that be done in a 
representative democracy in 
which the ultimate decision-
makers, the politicians, are 
subject to frequent elections 
in which political folklore 
tells us the determinant 
issues are proximate and 
‘courageous’ leaders are 
sacrificed to short-term voter 
self-interest?
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In fact, major policy changes have been 
made here and in other countries of our 
sort in which voters have submerged their 
individual interests in the national interest 
or in the interests of overall economic 
performance or social cohesion, or for 
altruistic, ethical or moral motives. To be 
successful and durable a policy change 
must be underpinned by consensus, or at 
least broad public acquiescence amounting 
to consensus by default. Thus, any policy 
settings, including fiscal policy settings, 
must be resilient: that is, have a strong 
core which endures through shocks and 
a surrounding flexibility which enables 
shocks to be absorbed, responded to and 
transcended or survived, and enables 
adaptation to changing conditions. 
A 40-year projection is also 
by definition multigenerational 
(transgenerational and intergenerational). 
Making multigenerational policy is not 
straightforward. In a democracy, future 
generations – those not yet born and 
those still children – do not vote, except 
to the extent that living generations take 
them into account and vote on their 
behalf (a sort of ‘virtual’ vote). Past 
generations – those who have died – also 
do not vote, except to the extent that 
tradition influences the votes of living 
generations (another ‘virtual’ vote). 
Among the living and voting generations 
there are different and competing values 
and priorities, and thus expectations and 
hopes of, and needs from, fiscal settings, 
which in a representative democracy 
shape and constrain politicians’ decisions 
on policy and can overweight the present 
at the expense of the future and generate 
perceptions of intergenerational inequity.1 
Some see this as a breakdown of an 
implied social contract or partnership.2 
There are continuities and trends, such 
as the changing nature of the ‘family’ and 
the constitution of households, the role 
of women, and the nature of education in 
response to the changing nature of ‘work’. 
Unless there is high inward migration 
similar to that which occurred after 1840, 
or there is a highly destructive pandemic 
or other disaster (both possible), the 
proportion of older people will likely 
rise. The geopolitical and geo-economic 
rebalancing of the past 30 years following 
the marketisation of the Chinese economy 
is likely to continue, with changes of 
direction and speed, and that rebalancing 
will set fiscal and other economic and 
social parameters. 
Disjunctive and transformative events
But long-range projections must also 
assume the possibility, even probability, 
of another shock of the size and impact 
of the global financial crisis, after which 
the global and local social, economic 
and political landscape is qualitatively 
different. The history of the past century 
or so suggests that in the next 50 years there 
will be another such disjunctive event. 
In addition, one or more transformative 
events are likely, which will also affect 
the context for policy. These events are 
unforeseen and unpredicted, though 
historians in retrospect habitually discern 
observable forces and pressures preceding 
a disjunctive event and a transformative 
event may be theorised, imagined or 
fantasised in advance. 
A disjunctive event suddenly 
accelerates social, political and economic 
change, rather as an earthquake suddenly 
repositions tectonic plates after a long 
build-up of pressure and reshapes 
the surface landscape; or irrupts from 
outside, much as a tsunami does; or 
results from a sudden breakdown of 
order in the complex system that is 
human society. Afterwards, the social and 
economic landscape looks different, often 
very different, and while much of what is 
on the landscape looks familiar, it, too, is 
often deeply changed. 
The standout example in the past 100 
years was the First World War, which far 
exceeded contemporaries’ expectations 
and resulted in the destruction of four 
empires, the serious weakening of a fifth, 
the killing of about 10 million soldiers, 
and the transformation of war, the rise 
of communism and fascism and a second 
destructive world war. A second example 
was the 1929 financial crash which 
caused worldwide economic depression 
(contributing to the rise of fascism), drove 
governments to actively manage their 
economies and reduce social disparities 
with far-reaching tax, education, health, 
housing and income support policies, 
and led to the creation of the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed-exchange rates, 
the International Monetary Fund and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
to guard against a repetition. Others are 
the 1973 oil price crisis, which ended 
the Bretton Woods regime, the collapse 
of communism in 1989, which radically 
changed the world order, and the recent 
global financial crisis. 
Why do these occur? Historian Niall 
Ferguson, among others, has argued that 
human society is a complex system, akin 
to a biological system. Such systems, 
he argues, are ‘made up of a very large 
number of interacting components 
that are asymmetrically organised’ and 
‘operate somewhere between order and 
disorder – on the edge of chaos’; they 
seem to be in equilibrium until ‘there 
comes a moment when they “go critical” 
… a very small trigger can set off a “phase 
transition” from a benign equilibrium to 
a crisis’ (Ferguson, 2012, p.22).3 
A transformative event is a scientific 
discovery or technological, political, 
business, organisational or way-of-
thinking innovation. It changes the 
quality of life or the way people live or 
see the world around them, often for 
better but sometimes for worse. Positive 
transformative events are the work of 
A Ma-ori in 1813 could not have predicted  
the disjunctive Treaty of Waitangi, and any  
New Zealander in 1973 might have imagined but 
not predicted the resurrection of the Treaty of 
Waitangi and the invention of biculturalism.
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what United States economist Richard 
Florida has called the creative class 
(Florida, 2002, 2007). They can contribute 
to or trigger disjunctive events. 
Transformative events in the 40 
years after 1913 included the discovery 
of penicillin and DNA’s double helix; 
the splitting of the atom; the invention 
of the transistor and the computer; and 
a fashion event, the bikini (a symbolic 
indicator of deep changes in mores to 
come).4 All had profound, unpredicted 
and unpredictable effects on economic 
and social life. Digital technology – the 
transistor-computer-internet-newmedia-
robotics-3D evolution – may only now in 
this decade be beginning to realise its true 
transformative influence on economic, 
social and political/security trajectories. 
A New Zealand forecaster in 
1913 would have been star-gazing or 
daydreaming to predict within 40 years 
aerial topdressing, social security and 
a national state health system, and 
14 years of a Labour government, all 
transformative. A Mäori in 1813 could not 
have predicted the disjunctive Treaty of 
Waitangi, and any New Zealander in 1973 
might have imagined but not predicted 
the resurrection of the Treaty of Waitangi 
and the invention of biculturalism.  
The point for policy makers is that, 
while there are trends in the evolution 
of societies, political systems and 
economies, there are also occasional 
events which distort, divert, accelerate 
or stall those trends or open new and 
out-of-the-ordinary possibilities. Such 
events in the next 40 years might be 
generated by the likes of climate change, 
water shortages, turmoil in the Middle 
East, a virulent pandemic, a new twist 
in hyper-globalisation, upsets in China 
and elsewhere in Asia, the collapse of 
multilateral rules-based systems such 
as the World Trade Organisation, new 
medical technologies and practices, 
new production methods, a radical 
generational shift, and New Zealand 
becoming a highly desirable place to live. 
That might suggest focusing on the 
predictable short term and not trying 
to plan for or make allowance for more 
distant events that might or might not 
happen. Actually, the whiplash in the 
fiscal parameters in 2008–09 suggests 
otherwise, as do the Canterbury 
earthquakes. Anticipating that there are 
outlier possibilities enables contingency 
planning, which in turns improves 
resilience in the face of the unpredicted. 
Over recent decades it has become more 
common for firms and some government 
agencies to scan the possibility of major 
disruptive – disjunctive or transformative 
– events and to have thought about it, 
so that if one happens at least some 
contingency planning has been done.5 
At the same time, wise firms and 
governments also work out what they 
most expect to happen over three, five, 
ten or 20 years. They can then take 
early action to counter adversity or take 
advantage of opportunity. Government 
in essence is about risk management and 
the risks to be managed are distant and 
proximate, known and unknown, natural 
and societal.  
Risk management and anticipatory policy 
change
One way of looking at this is suggested in 
a recent paper by the Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG). The paper argued that: 
‘Governments have become flexible about 
what they should do but rigid about how 
to do it. Good strategy in government 
involves doing the opposite: being clear 
about goals but flexible about how to 
deliver them.’ Societies, BCG argued, ‘are 
identical neither to machines, which can be 
engineered’ – by inference the presumption 
that underlay the interventionist, planned 
welfare state – ‘nor to biological systems, 
which evolve by themselves. Instead, they 
combine aspects of both and hence need a 
mixture of direction and adaptation’. BCG 
instanced foresight and scenario planning 
techniques, which ‘can’t predict the future 
but can prepare you for it’; then different 
types of policies can be applied to prepare 
for and manage through uncertainties: 
‘no-regrets initiatives’, ‘hedges against key 
risks’, ‘boundary or handrail issues’ and 
‘core bets’ (Baker et al., 2012). 
The BCG paper is not the first or 
last word. But it illustrates the decision-
making context for long-term fiscal 
projections: to prepare for the most likely 
eventuality well before it happens, and 
also to keep in mind the possibility of 
shocks and think about how to manage 
them if they occur. 
The usual default position, by 
contrast, is to take no action until forced 
to by a crisis. But an OECD study of 
major decisions on pensions and health 
services (detailed in James, 2012, pp.19-
20) found that those made in response 
to a crisis, while easier to promote at the 
time, are likely to endure only if there are 
quick pay-offs (OECD, 2010). The OECD 
warned that while a crisis opens a window 
of opportunity,6 that might as a result 
come when there is less financial scope 
to meet upfront costs to ensure reforms 
work, can obscure long-term needs and 
objectives and can lead to capture by 
some agencies. 
That suggests durable major reforms 
reflect some combination of deeper 
currents – demographic, economic, social, 
psycho-sociological, intellectual, political-
sociological, or external (geo-economic, 
geopolitical or bilateral-national). That 
was so in major policy changes in Britain 
through the 19th century and New 
Zealand in the 1890s, 1930s and 1980s 
(detailed in James, 2012, pp.11-18). There 
were a number of drivers, with a different 
mix in each case: deep change in the 
demographic or class structure of society 
and/or in the economy or commercial 
practice; social distress and humanitarian 
... an OECD study of major decisions on pensions 
and health services ... found that those made in 
response to a crisis, while easier to promote at the 
time, are likely to endure only if there are quick 
pay-offs ... 
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concerns, including as a result of 
economic depression; fear of disorder 
if no action is taken and/or reaction to 
disorder; a major shift in the prevailing 
intellectual wisdoms or fashions, picked 
up by and advocated by political parties 
and/or officials; courage, leadership or 
political will and/or strategic thinking 
and/or visionary ambition exhibited by 
leading public figures; interest group 
pressure, especially if there is a change 
in the balance of interest groups; fiscal 
pressure; and momentum once action 
was initiated. 
The OECD study also suggests that 
for major reform to be durable it must 
either give effect to, anticipate or build 
consensus, or at least majority support. 
Most policy change is incremental, and 
either builds consensus or a majority 
progressively with each increment, 
or gives effect to an already existing 
consensus or majority. Major policy 
reform will endure if it evokes or reflects 
a pre-existing latent consensus, as for 
social security in the 1930s. But if the 
reform is unexpected or unforeshadowed 
– that is, a shock – or is in anticipation of 
events not yet experienced by or evident 
to the majority (as with climate change), 
the reform will endure only if consensus 
can be constructed as the reforms are 
done or shortly afterwards. Consensus 
was slow to develop after New Zealand’s 
radical 1984–92 deregulatory reforms: 
the vote for MMP was essentially a vote 
against both the Labour and National 
parties for departing from their social 
democratic and moderate conservative 
roots respectively. A quasi-consensus did 
eventually develop, but it was by way of 
gradual acquiescence to the new policy 
settings because Labour and National 
offered no alternative, rather than 
positive endorsement (see further James, 
2012, pp.22-4). 
Climate change is not the only issue 
which poses the question of whether 
policy should be anticipatory. Others 
include (and this is only an indicative 
list): resource sustainability here and 
abroad, especially of water (and so food 
production) and minerals; the impact 
of new forms of economic globalisation 
on the distribution of work; the impact 
of 3D printing and other new forms of 
production technology for goods and 
services; the geopolitical and security 
implications of the rise of China; and the 
implications of gene technology, among 
other emerging forms of treatment of 
illness, disability and physical inequalities. 
All have the potential to profoundly alter 
the fiscal trajectory over the next 40 
years. 
Particularly pertinent to that fiscal 
trajectory is the ‘ageing’ of the population 
– a higher proportion of older people 
dependent on a smaller proportion of 
‘working-age’ people. The presumption 
is that health costs and income support 
(superannuation) for this larger ‘aged’ 
group will rise to the point that they 
are too onerous for those who will be of 
‘working age’. 
The policy argument for anticipatory 
policy change is that it is less onerous to 
take early action than to change policy 
only when the costs begin to mount, 
and that policy change made deliberately 
and over time is also more likely to be 
durable than policy made under fiscal 
pressure or in crisis. The policy argument 
against anticipatory policy change is that 
action may not be necessary because 
circumstances might change and there 
is an opportunity cost in taking needless 
action. Will population projections turn 
out to be accurate, or too low or high? 
Will the fact of more older people add 
to health care costs, or might near-end-
of-life health costs fall because baby-
boomers have lived a better-fed, healthier 
and less physically wearing childhood and 
working-age life and will be healthier for 
longer, and thus physicians may intervene 
less vigorously near end of life? Will new 
technology go on driving up health care 
options and costs, or might technology, 
coupled with workforce organisational 
change and price-reducing innovation in 
‘emerging’ countries, reduce health care 
costs in net terms and reverse the current 
net-positive effect? Will 70 be the new 65 
and so will more people continue in paid 
work, thereby lowering pension costs, or 
might rising capital accumulation costs 
increase pension costs? 
These sorts of questions, unanswerable 
in advance, underline that any long-
term fiscal path chosen or foreshadowed 
raises issues of transgenerational 
and intergenerational equity and 
sustainability: transgenerational as 
between the generations at any point 
in the 40 years, and intergenerational 
as between a particular generation’s 
experience a generation hence and their 
corresponding age cohort now. 
Today’s cohort of politicians is trapped 
in short-term electoral cycles, and their 
officials are bound to carry out their 
lawful decisions. In that sense officials are 
‘state’ servants. But those same officials 
are also ‘public’ servants, bound to keep 
in mind, to develop and redevelop and to 
promote a long and broad view on behalf 
of the public. 
Participation and leadership
This dimension of officials’ brief 
highlights that in a modern liberal 
democracy parliamentary representation 
is not sufficient.7 Increasingly, the public 
(more accurately some of the public) 
expects to participate at some times in 
decisions on some things in some way or 
to some degree, or expects at least to be 
listened to or acknowledged. Increasingly, 
mechanisms are being constructed, tested 
and used to develop, refine and validate 
policy change. Without that validation, 
policy change may not be durable (King 
et al., 1998).
Increasingly, the public ... expects to participate at 
some times in decisions on some things in some 
way or to some degree, or expects at least to be 
listened to or acknowledged.
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This doesn’t diminish the importance 
of leadership. Any durable major policy 
change, including anticipatory change, 
requires leadership, either by political 
leaders or as a result of their responding 
to leadership from outside the formal 
political system through one of a number 
of mechanisms. The most promising of 
these mechanisms entail some public 
involvement. Politicians themselves 
have generated it through opening up 
access to information (via the Official 
Information Act), making Cabinet papers 
public and consulting on proposed policy 
in a variety of ways, including discussion 
papers, parliamentary select committee 
hearings, meetings with the iwi leaders 
forum, and advisory and working groups 
(tax, welfare). 
This growing expectation is not 
a linear growth. People get involved 
sporadically, issue by issue, and many still 
never get involved. But there does appear 
to be a trajectory. This suggests that 
leaving long-term fiscal matters to officials 
and politicians (though politicians do 
the final sign-off of any policy) will not 
generate the underpinning consensus 
needed to address those matters durably 
and to enable adjustments through time. 
Extra-parliamentary mechanisms for reform
There is a wide range of extra-
parliamentary mechanisms, ranging 
from populist through experimental to 
prototype. 
One experiment initiated by ministers 
was the Land and Water Forum to 
develop the basis for water policy through 
‘collaborative governance’. In 2009 this 
brought together all 58 organisations with 
an interest in allocation and management 
of water and mandated them to reach 
consensus on the foundations of policy. 
That took three and a half years and the 
government is now broadly implementing 
its report. Labour and the Greens have 
backed it, too. Its virtue was the broad 
buy-in by all interest groups, including by 
iwi, so iwi cultural, economic and other 
perspectives and needs were explicitly 
incorporated. 
But collaborative governance of this 
sort does not involve the general public, 
whose views are not wholly expressed 
through interest groups any more 
accurately or completely than through 
political parties. Nor are all Mäori 
represented by iwi leaders, who in any 
case have direct access outside the forum 
(and any other channel) to negotiate 
with senior ministers as the ‘Treaty (of 
Waitangi) partner’. 
An alternative is a binding referendum. 
Switzerland has the most developed 
referendum system, deciding a wide range 
of matters at federal, canton and local 
level that way, with extensive programmes 
to inform the public on each issue 
(though this can hold up progress, as in 
the fact that women did not get the vote 
in all elections until 1990). In many states 
in the United States there are binding 
citizens-initiated referendums (known as 
propositions), some of which have had 
unintended consequences. Here, citizens-
initiated referendums are non-binding, 
and no government has yet acted on one, 
as the current government has signalled 
will be the case if the referendum on 
asset sales goes against sales. Otherwise, 
referendums are still rare, though it is 
now close to a constitutional convention 
that major constitutional or electoral 
change must be decided by referendum.  
Critics say complex issues cannot 
be reduced to the simple form in which 
a referendum question must be stated, 
and that it is impossible, or at least 
impracticable, to sufficiently educate 
the general public to elicit an informed 
decision. The complexity of issues 
involved in long-term fiscal projections 
suggest that the necessary decisions 
would not fit a referendum format. 
An alternative is a national convention, 
as used to draft the original United 
States constitution, and, in February 
1998, in Australia to draft a referendum 
on whether Australia should abolish the 
monarchy in favour of a republic. But a 
national convention tends to be of the 
‘great and the good’.8 
A parliamentary petition can involve 
the wider public, if many sign. This 
still leaves the decision in the hands of 
the politicians, but can at times force 
their hand, as in 1970 over the proposal 
to raise Lake Manapouri as part of a 
hydroelectricity project. Public opinion 
polls and focus groups are extensively 
used by political parties and interest 
groups to gauge public opinion, and, 
within limits, mould it. But polls are in 
effect referendums without responsibility 
and usually based on limited knowledge. 
Moreover, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to assemble a fully random 
sample of voters. A focus group is a 
sort of ‘jury’: an issue is discussed for 
one or two hours, with information 
progressively inserted into the discussion 
so that over time the group comes to a 
more considered opinion than is possible 
in a poll. But focus groups are not 
representative. 
There is a wide variety of other for-
mal and semi-formal mechanisms.9 One 
survey lists citizens juries, planning cells, 
deliberative polling, consensus confer-
ences and citizens panels (Abelson et 
al., 2003). Another lists focus groups, 
citizens juries, consensus conferences, 
cooperative discourse, dialogue groups, 
stakeholder workshops, participatory ex-
pert workshops, reflection forums, delib-
erative interviews, voluntary agreements, 
eco-audits, policy simulation exercises, 
deliberative foresights, concerted envi-
ronmental management, mediation, reg-
ulatory negotiation, consultative forums, 
deliberative conflict resolution processes 
and environmental negotiations (Van 
den Hove, 2006).
Public opinion polls and focus groups are 
extensively used by political parties and interest 
groups [but] ... there is a wide variety of other 
formal and semi-formal mechanisms.
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‘Deliberative’ and ‘participatory’ reform
In those lists there are two important words. 
One is ‘deliberative’. One commentator 
argues that ‘[t]he essence of democracy 
is now widely taken to be deliberation, as 
opposed to voting, interest aggregation, 
constitutional rights or even self-
government’ (Dryzek, 2000, p.1, as quoted 
in Abelson et al., 2003). This involves, 
according to another, ‘a particular sort of 
discussion – one that involves the careful 
and serious weighing of reasons for and 
against some proposition’ (Fearon, 1998, 
p.1, as quoted in Abelson et al., 2003).
The other important word is 
‘participatory’. Citizens juries and 
planning cells have been used in the 
United States and Germany respectively 
to examine an issue and present a 
conclusion to the media, interested 
groups or a sponsor. Variations have been 
tried in emerging-economy countries and 
developing-economy countries. But a 
criticism is that the juries do not parallel 
actual courtroom juries: they involve 
only the jurors and witnesses and do not 
feature lawyers contesting evidence or 
judges. 
Consensus conferences in Denmark 
inquire into scientific or technical issues 
and have been used to develop clinical 
guidelines. The goal is ‘not to reach a 
kind of objective scientific truth but to 
feed into the political channels and clarify 
public opinion’. They have been running 
for 20 years, ‘have received due political 
recognition ... are closely followed by the 
media, there is always a great attendance 
of public and a lively public discussion 
about the issue and the recommendations 
of the panel afterwards’ (Zurita, 2006, 
p.21). But note that they are used for 
tightly defined issues, not large, multi-
decadal issues. 
Deliberative polling assembles a large, 
representative, random sample who 
deliberate over two to three days, usually 
on a national issue. Again, they are not 
used to make decisions, but they do 
present much more considered positions 
on significant topics: for example, in 
Britain on crime, the monarchy, the 
future of Europe and the health service. 
A Japanese deliberative poll involving 
127 people (from a random nationwide 
sample of 3000) at Keio University on 28–
29 May 2011 on the topic ‘Pension system, 
a generational choice’ first met in small 
groups with experts, then in a plenary, 
totalling ten hours of deliberation. 
Among the conclusions were that ‘the 
consumption tax should be increased and 
used for social security’ and ‘we should 
take future generations into account 
more than the current generation’ 
(Nemoti, 2011). Support for both of 
those propositions was greater when 
participants were asked after deliberation 
than before. A Victoria University survey 
of attitudes to climate change-driven sea-
level rise found that different responses 
were elicited according to whether any 
information was given, and, if so, whether 
a reference year of 2050 or 2100 was used 
and whether projections were moderate 
or extreme, ‘though effects were usually 
small’: ‘People were generally more 
concerned and more supportive when 
they received information’ (Evans et al., 
2012, p.3).10
A more ambitious version of citizen 
deliberation is the citizens assembly. 
Citizens assemblies have been used 
in British Columbia and Ontario in 
Canada (mandated by the provincial 
parliaments) and in Holland (mandated 
by the government) to come up with 
recommendations on electoral reform.11 
The British Columbia assembly followed 
the most exhaustive process of the three, 
over 11 months: near-random selection 
of 160 people, one male and one female 
from each riding; a learning phase over 
six weekends, involving experts and 
wide reading, which resulted in ‘these 
ordinary citizens’ acquiring ‘an extensive 
knowledge and understanding of electoral 
systems’; a consultative phase during 
which members went out to public 
hearings in 50 meetings, some attended 
by politicians, coupled with a website 
which received written submissions and 
proposals; then deliberation. The process 
culminated in a recommendation to the 
parliament, which put the question to a 
referendum which was narrowly defeated 
(it required 60% to pass and the vote was 
57.7%). Polling found members of the 
public trusted the assembly as being more 
like themselves than politicians (though 
indigenous and ethnic minorities were 
heavily under-represented). The other 
two assemblies also resulted in no change, 
for other reasons (Hayward).
How useful could these mechanisms 
be in reaching decisions on major policy 
change, especially anticipatory policy 
change? One assessment of the British 
Columbia assembly found that ‘citizen 
political decision-making appeared 
to be of a remarkably high quality’ 
(Vander Ploeg, 2003, p.222, as quoted 
in Hayward) and showed that citizens 
‘have the capacity to shed their apathy, 
overcome their ignorance and reason 
conscientiously about an unfamiliar and 
complex political issue’ (Warren and 
Pearse, 2008, p.6, as quoted in Hayward). 
After all, politicians are amateurs, too. 
But assemblies have not yet been 
widely tested on national issues, and all 
three on electoral systems did not result 
in change. Moreover, electoral systems, 
while complex, are not as complex as 
fiscal issues, especially long-term fiscal 
issues. Hence one observer’s assessment 
that, ‘While in theory deliberative 
processes could be designed to guarantee 
binding decisions, in reality the stakes are 
often too high to delegate this authority 
to a group of citizens and the public may 
not care to assume this level of decision-
making authority’ (Abelson et al., 2003, 
p.247). If they were to be effective on 
long-term fiscal issues, they would need 
development. 
Where this approach does seem to get 
closer to decision-making is at the local 
level. Citizen commissions are widely 
used in Switzerland to resolve differences 
... electoral systems, while complex, are not as 
complex as fiscal issues, especially long-term 
fiscal issues.  
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over such matters as where to site a waste 
disposal plant or infrastructure projects 
(Anonymous, 2012). A New Zealand 
example that attracted international 
academic attention was a planning 
project in Wanaka in 2002 to develop a 
plan for 2020 (Bond and Thompson-
Fawcett, 2007).
Nevertheless, even if a citizens 
assembly (or jury) is not yet a proven 
vehicle for decision-making at national 
level, could it be useful in shaping public 
opinion? If the media were to take an 
interest, that might generate wider public 
interest, and if the assembly was seen 
to be representative and not beholden 
to any political party or interest group, 
its deliberation and recommendations 
might get traction. At the least, an 
assembly could open a channel for better 
communication of, and better education 
about, policy issues and decisions, at 
the same time requiring more rigorous 
explanation to citizens. 
An assembly is probably not enough 
on its own and would need reinforcing. 
There is a risk that it could be misused 
by politicians and officials to co-opt 
or persuade (Roberts, 1997).12 It can be 
costly, may not actually engage citizens 
beyond those directly involved, and may 
not be any more representative (and 
perhaps be less representative) than 
politicians, since the vocations of those 
involved don’t depend on the outcome 
and might (as with politicians) produce 
a result reflecting the preoccupations 
or emotions of those who get involved. 
One checklist of settings for effective and 
efficient citizen participation is: ‘careful 
selection of a representative group of 
stakeholders; a transparent decision-
making process to build trust among the 
participants; clear authority in decision-
making; competent and unbiased group 
facilitators; regular meetings; and 
adequate financial resources’ (Maitlis and 
Ozcelik, 2004, p.390).
Addressing the policy tensions
If a citizens assembly did address long-
term fiscal issues, it would have to wrestle 
with three major tensions. One is the 
balance between PAYGO (paying for 
government services out of current tax 
revenue and borrowing) and SAYGO 
(the government and/or individuals 
saving and accumulating funds to address 
current and future service expectations 
and liabilities). New Zealand has for 
many decades favoured PAYGO, though 
the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 
KiwiSaver and the Accident Compensation 
Corporation’s future liability funding are 
public examples of SAYGO. 
Related to that is intragenerational 
equity. The balance between funding 
services from taxes and from private 
funding has obvious implications for 
the spread of income and wealth and 
so personal well-being (that is, for 
‘inequality’), and therefore for social 
cohesion at any given time and potentially, 
if not addressed, over time. Tied up with 
this is intergenerational equity, the equity 
between generations at any one time. 
Related to that is transgenerational 
equity, fairness of contribution and 
access to services as generations age and 
new generations arise. Is it right to have 
sudden shifts between SAYGO and PAYGO 
or in intragenerational equity, or should 
any necessary changes be smoothed over 
time? A liberal-Enlightenment approach 
based on the primacy of individual 
liberty and sanctity might argue that it is, 
that generations and cohorts are separate 
and costs should lie where they fall. A 
conservative, Burkean notion of ‘contract’ 
or ‘partnership’, binding generations to 
each other, might take the opposite view. 
Deciding these matters will be in a 
context in which the countries with which 
we trade and compete will increasingly 
be those which have far less developed 
social support systems and which, as 
they do build those systems to offset 
unsustainable inequalities, are unlikely to 
expand them to ‘western’ economies’ peak 
levels. That will require New Zealand to 
recalibrate its assessment of the optimal, 
desirable and possible levels of taxation 
and state spending against a different, 
and less generous, set of comparator 
countries (see, among others, Tanzi, 2005 
and 2011, and McRae, 2011 (reviewing 
Tanzi, 2011)).13 
In a democracy these questions 
are resolved, one way or another, by 
the people, usually through the crude 
mechanism of elections, the rise and fall 
of political parties and their ideologies, 
the interplay of interest groups, pressure 
groups and politicians, and, occasionally, 
mass public action. When affairs are going 
smoothly these adjustments go fairly 
smoothly too. But in crisis, or (as now) 
after a disjunctive shock or facing loom-
ing major geopolitical, geo-economic or 
national changes, some predictable, some 
unknowable, there is arguably value in 
developing the means to discover and 
develop public consensus and, with that, 
resilience. Given New Zealand’s past 
capacity for inventive policy, in three 
periods of major change and in a range 
of policy innovations between those 
periods, there is no compelling reason 
why it cannot develop the model for 21st-
century democracy. 
Of all the mechanisms canvassed 
above, the most promising would be 
either a national convention or a citizens 
assembly: a transparently representative 
citizens assembly would be more 
appropriate because more democratic. 
Even though fiscal matters, being very 
complex, may be thought beyond the 
capability of ‘ordinary’ citizens, analysis 
suggests that there is no compelling reason 
why a well-constituted assembly could 
not gain a good understanding of the 
Of all the mechanisms canvassed ... , the most 
promising would be either a national convention or 
a citizens assembly: a transparently representative 
citizens assembly would be more appropriate 
because more democratic. 
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issues and produce a sensible, politically 
saleable and sustainable outcome. 
But there would be no point to calling 
a citizens assembly unless it was of high 
quality in its selection, the commitment 
of its members, the information it was 
given and the way that information is 
debated, and its connection with the 
wider citizenry. Political parties would 
need to commit to taking its findings 
seriously. Logically, such an assembly 
would also not be a singular event but 
repeated every ten years or so. By the end 
of 40 years, if the process worked well, it 
would likely become a workable fixture. 
That is a very tall order. It would 
amount, in short, to setting an 
international standard, a big challenge 
to politicians’ and officials’ capacity for 
leadership. 
1 Bull (2012) presents an interesting discussion of this point in 
the context of climate change.
2 For example, Ferguson (2012, p.43) quotes Edmund Burke: 
‘one of the first and most leading principles on which the 
commonwealth and the laws are consecrated is, lest the 
temporary possessors and life-renters in it, unmindful of 
what they have received from their ancestors or of what is 
due to their posterity, should act as if they were the entire 
masters, that they should not think it among their rights 
to cut off the entail or commit waste on the inheritance by 
destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their 
society, hazarding to leave to those who come after them a 
ruin instead of an habitation – and teaching these successors 
as little to respect their contrivances as they had themselves 
respected the institutions of their forefathers ... Society 
is indeed a contract ... the state ... is ... a partnership 
not only between those who are living but between those 
who are living, those who are dead and those who are 
to be born.’ Ferguson applied the quote to ‘the enormous 
intergenerational transfers implied by current fiscal policies’, 
which he saw as ‘a shocking and perhaps unparalleled 
breach of precisely that partnership’. 
3 Ferguson continues (p.25): ‘The political and economic 
structures made by humans share many of the features of 
complex adaptive systems ... Whether the canopy of a rain 
forest or the trading floor of Wall Street, complex systems 
share certain characteristics. A small input to such a system 
can produce huge, often unanticipated changes – what 
scientists call the amplifier effect ... Causal relationships 
are often nonlinear, which means that traditional methods 
of generalising through observation (such as trend analysis 
and sampling) are of little use. Some theorists of complexity 
... say that complex systems are wholly non-deterministic, 
meaning that it is impossible to make predictions about their 
future behaviour based on existing data. When things go 
wrong in a complex system the scale of disruption is nearly 
impossible to anticipate.’
4 If we look out 47 years from 1913 to 1960 (the span from 
2013 to 2060), there were also the launching of the first 
space satellite in 1957 and the contraceptive pill (approved 
for use in 1960). 
5 In an environmental scan looking out ten years I did with 
Statistics New Zealand through the second half of 2006, 
I rated as a 25% probability: ‘Imbalances unwind messily; 
recession or sharp slowdown in US triggers world recession’, 
and as a possible ‘shock’ ‘a full-scale world recession, 
triggered by terrorism, a messy unwinding of the imbalances 
or natural/medical disasters’. Other possible shocks included: 
‘The Middle East explodes/implodes and/or revolution in 
Saudi Arabia’, and ‘Major earthquake devastates Wellington’; 
both had some relation to recent actual events. So, too, did 
another 25% probability: ‘Significant earthquake in less 
populated area’. 
6 Roger Douglas as finance minister used to talk explicitly of 
the window of opportunity, a financial squeeze opened for 
the 1980s policy changes which he spearheaded. In the 
wake of the 1987 stockmarket crash he thought he had 
another window of opportunity, this time for a flat tax, but 
Prime Minister David Lange, backed by a (silent) majority in 
the Labour caucus, shut the window. 
7 This may be a partial explanation for declining election 
turnouts over the past 50 years (though there is no hard 
research evidence that this is so). Voting is more a delegation 
of authority than a form of participation. 
8 This distinguishes a national convention from an unofficial 
gathering called a ‘convention’ (such as the women’s 
convention in New Zealand in the 1970s). 
9 Valentina Dinica of the School of Government, Victoria 
University of Wellington, assisted with some pointers in this 
section of the original paper.   
10 Evans et al. (p.3) go on to note that ‘When focused on 
extreme projections, people anticipated greater sea level 
rise, felt that sea-level rise was a more serious problem for 
them personally, and showed greater support for adapting 
to climate change and for individual adaptation options, 
such as accommodation and retreat. They also perceived 
sea-level rise as a nearer-term threat when information was 
framed to focus on 2050 and the more extreme projections. 
Importantly, more “extreme” information always resulted in 
more concern and support from respondents.’
11 The British government used what it billed as a 
citizens assembly to build initial support for raising the 
superannuation age. But informal comments to me from a 
participant indicate it was managed by the government and 
so does not warrant description as a citizens assembly in the 
sense it is used in this article – certainly not on the British 
Columbia model, where politicians kept at arm’s length 
except in some of the public hearings. 
12 This could be said of the British example cited above. 
13 Tanzi has argued an optimal taxation level of 35% of GDP. 
This compares with around 25% in New Zealand in 1973, a 
difference which raises questions about the value of setting a 
precise number on taxation. 
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